### **SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY**

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# About the System Fundamentals of Russia's Economic Security\*



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Presidential Decree 208 of May 13, 2017 approved the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030. Unfortunately, the approach adopted and implemented in the strategy proved to be unnecessarily abstracted from the natural connection between the state of economic security and the type of current economic system. Therefore, it seems appropriate to provide some "notes for the future", which deal with system fundamentals of Russia's economic security.

Why are these notes necessary? Why did I have to give them in the form of brief comments? The reason is that the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation

for the period till 2030, in its approved version, does not take into consideration basic foundations of economic security in Russia. Here I mean the most fundamental basics that have system-wide character. In particular, the commanding heights of the economy, whose property – sovereign or non-sovereign – they are, in whose hands they are and in whose interests they are used – in the interests of Russia or in the interests of the oligarchic-comprador capital that is allied to foreign capital and hostile to domestic industrial capital.

It is useful to clarify that the comprador bourgeoisie is part of the national bourgeoisie, which irrevocably submits to the foreign

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capital of imperialist countries in economic and political terms and is used by them in their imperialist interests. It is used by imperialist powers as a vassal, which helps them keep the country in the state of enslaved colony.

In post-Soviet Russia, oligarchic capital swore allegiance to imperialist ideology of the Washington Consensus, the ideology imposed by the United States upon the whole world due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, an oligarchic economic system formed in the period of anti-Soviet reforms in the 1980s — 1990s and aimed to maximize natural and intermediary rent by transforming Russian property into foreign property took the form of that driven by raw materials export, rent-oriented, and monetarist.

Is it possible to ensure economic safety and economic sovereignty of the country, if there is no sovereignty over the command heights of the economy: land, extraction of raw materials, energy and transport infrastructure, banks, foreign trade, storage, commodity-money circulation, etc.?

Is economic security compatible with the system-wide crisis, due to which Russia lost the status of industrial, technological and engineering power and returned to the group of resource-extracting nations?

Does modern history contain any examples when a country whose economy is driven by export of raw materials and whose socio-economic system is dominated by the comprador form of capitalist ownership was able to end the dependence on foreign capital, to gain economic independence and break free from the shackles of backwardness?

Is it possible to achieve economic security and sovereignty in conditions when the oligarchic nature of the socio-economic system dominates and squeezes out maximum rent by transforming Russian national wealth into non-Russian, i.e. foreign and offshore?

These are the fundamental questions that arise from the realities of the post-reform Russia and, consequently, are basic in the development of a full-fledged strategy for the country's economic security.

Meanwhile, these questions were disregarded and they did not become a base for those who compiled an adopted version of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030. As a result, they remain underdeveloped and are left unanswered. In reality, however, without solving a system-wide issue all other minor issues remain unsettled as well — it is an axiom of public life.

Having no adequate system-wide framework, the adopted Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 lists only phenomena but not their causes; it deals with issues of private and secondary order without affecting the overall and paramount ones. Thus, this document is doomed to be only formal. And we can be sure that it contains plenty of formalism.

But the trouble with this document lies not only in its formalism and declarative nature. Abstract phrases deliberately reduced to overly general and weasel allegations rarely convey an erroneous position or set out fallacious guidelines. The text of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 proved peculiar in this aspect as well: for several declarative points, as we will show, it contains not just wrong guidelines that do not support but rather oppose the process of ensuring economic security of Russia.

Why did this happen? Because the drafters of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 did not consider key features of the economic system of historically highest order.

No doubt, being determines consciousness. And if an individual is in the conditions of an economic system of a lower order, like the comprador system, it is not easy for them to rise to the level of beliefs typical of those who look on and evaluate reality from the position of a socio-economic system of a higher rank. But there exist fundamental laws and laws of modern era. They are known to economic science. And scientific knowledge of them helps understand what is historically higher.

Thus, scientific ideas about the advanced and sovereign economic system prove the observations discussed further in the paper.

#### § 1. The strategy of doing nothing?

In the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 the state of economic security is linked to economic sovereignty; in general, it is right. But the interpretation of economic sovereignty given in Paragraph 7 is clearly not thought through and deprives the whole link of any sense by relegating economic sovereignty to the "independence of the

state in conducting internal and external economic policy", and it is supposed that this independence "objectively exists".

First, such interpretation completely separates economic security from its system basis and substitutes the true objective with a false one. Indeed, it shifts the focus from economic basis to political superstructure, from the primary to the secondary and derivative, and from economic system to economic policy. The independence and sovereignty of economic system is replaced by the independence of economic policy.

It turns out that instead of actual economic sovereignty the document urges to be content with the formal, ostentatious and feigned. It sets a fictitious objective function, as a result of which it becomes a fiction itself.

Second, if independence of economic policy is something that exists objectively regardless of the will and consciousness of people, then it is useless either to achieve it or strengthen it. In this case it is enough just to maintain a semblance of the work that aims to ensure the independence of economic policy.

Both observations are entirely consistent with one another and quite clearly demonstrate the fictitious nature of the goals set out in the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030.

Without a system-wide framework and without reference to system-wide goals the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 is not a guide to the authorities, but another legal fiction — akin to the laws on strategic planning and industrial policy. Instead of clear rules and

regulations it expresses a set of declarations, not all of them being correct. Judging by its objectives, in its current version it is a strategy of doing nothing.

Of course, this assessment is not really partial, but it is fair and is confirmed more than sufficiently in the analysis of further paragraphs of the document.

Let us give one, but quite revealing and symptomatic, example of matching economic security and strategic planning.

#### § 2. Implementing the failure to implement

As far as we know, the Soviet Union had no legal act on national economic planning, neither did it need such a law: before the implementation of destructive reforms there operated a planned economic system, which included state-wide centralized planning of the Soviet economy and a national body, Gosplan of the USSR.

In post-Soviet Russia on the contrary, the situation is different. In June 2014, Federal Law 172 "About strategic planning in the Russian Federation" was adopted. The law exists, but it does not work, because there is no federal authority, no system, and no mechanism for strategic planning.

Despite the existence of the federal law, Russia does not have strategic planning and strategic plans for socio-economic development. Fundamental criteria and a model of strategic planning are not defined, not to mention the creation of a workable mechanism. Current practice proves that the term "strategic" as applied to planning means "non-existent". In fact, strategic planning in Russia is a non-existent planning.

However, the drafters of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 found it appropriate to tie it to strategic planning, which is currently also nothing but legal fiction.

In particular, the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 is declared to be a "strategic planning document" (Item 1).

It is also required that "the challenges and threats to economic security" were taken into consideration "when developing strategic planning documents in the field of socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation" (Item 13).

Unfortunately, further in the document there is juggling of empty rhetoric, when the main direction of "state policy in the sphere of ensuring economic security" is explained as the "development of strategic planning system in economic sphere" (Item 15), and the main goal — as "improving the system of strategic planning" (Item 16).

In comparison with the realities it turns out that the main direction is the development of the non-existent, and the main task is to improve the same non-existent.

On top of all this is the final position that the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 is implemented in the process of implementation of a package of measures "developed in the framework of strategic planning in the Russian Federation" (Item 33).

Since strategic planning does not exist in Russia even in its initial phase, the drafters of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 envisaged the implementation of a failure to implement.

This conclusion is corroborated by target functions of the two phases of realization of this document: the first one — until 2019, and the second one — until 2030. By 2019 it is planned to develop and implement measures "to ensure economic security"; and by 2030 — to implement "measures to neutralize challenges and threats to economic security" (Item 32).

A logical consequence is that challenges and threats to Russia's economic security will remain until at least 2030. And among them, by the way, is "the exhaustion of raw materials export model of economic development" (Item 12).

Therefore, the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 involves preservation of raw materials export model, which can only by mistake be considered "a model of economic development" up to 2030. According to the viewpoint of the drafters of the document, it is simply impossible before 2030 to shift to a sovereign economic system in order to rid Russia of its role as a raw materials appendage of foreign capital and overcome its deindustrialization.

Therefore, the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 is not a strategy for dealing with raw materials export model and introducing a model of new digital industrialization of our country. Its drafters believe that Russia's economic security can be based on raw materials export model, despite its "exhaustion".

## § 3. Economic security – the security of raw materials export model?

That which starts from fiction and rests on fiction, ends with fiction, as well. Raw materials export model is a form of existence of a comprador economic system created under the pressure of foreign capital and aimed at satisfying its interests. This kind of economic system is by definition non-sovereign and critically dependent on external factors beyond control of the Russian government.

Therefore, the preservation of raw materials export model is identical to the preservation of an economic system of a historically lower type: the system obviously nonsovereign and in particular dependent on the imperialism of the US dollar. In such system conditions Russia's economic security is not more than the economic security of a neocolony, from which global imperialism drains natural, material and human resources with the help of oligarchic capital.

And, paradoxically, the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 is designed so that the challenges and threats to economic security are challenges and threats to raw materials export model. Judging by the list of main challenges and threats (Item 12), the protection of economic security is understood as nothing but the protection of the oligarchic system and raw materials export model.

In order to confirm these statements let us provide several specific examples out of the above list.

The first place in the list of main challenges and threats to our economic security belongs to "the desire of developed countries to use their advantages in the level of development of economy, high technology (including information) as a tool of global competition" (Item 12).

If we consider this formulation, then it is impossible not to notice that it turns everything upside down and substitutes internal factors with external ones. In fact, our economic security is not threatened either by the advantages of industrialized countries or by the fact that they possess high technology. The problem is that Russia lost its former advantages of an industrialized power, plunged into de-industrialization and ceased to produce technology advanced in its scientific and technical levels.

In short, a threat to Russia's security lies not in the high technology of other countries, but in the absence of high technology of our own. This is how things are in reality. But the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 presents the state of affairs in another way by hiding the true cause of economic dependence on industrialized countries. Thus the correct benchmark is replaced by a wrong one.

Nevertheless, the specified wording has some sense. High technology generated by a new, technetronic and digital industrialization and launched by industrialized countries is a threat to the profitability of raw materials export model. Neo-industrialization leads to the formation of post-oil energy industry, which, in turn, causes revolutionary changes in the structure of electric power balance and leads to a reduction in foreign demand for Russian hydrocarbons. In 2011, there emerged a phenomenon of negative elasticity of EU demand concerning the price of oil and gas imports from Russia.

As a result, there emerged a trend of reduction in comprador rent. Over time this trend will only continue to grow, and its pace will accelerate. Moreover, foreign capital has taken root on the commanding heights of our economy and predictably seeks to lower costs intended for the maintenance of oligarchic mediation in post-Soviet Russia.

As for the attitude of global imperialism toward Russia, everything is clear in this regard. But a threat to the comprador rent must not be mistaken for a threat to economic security of the country, because the genuine cause of dependence on foreign capital is the very comprador socio-economic system, or the system of comprador power and property.

Finally, it would be simply absurd if industrialized countries abandoned the idea of using high technology in global competition. Capitalist competition, if we do not reduce its understanding to a primitive conventional stamp, is a battle for the appropriation of surplus value among various private capitals, the battle won only by the capital whose technological level is the highest.

Classic scientific works call the law of capitalist appropriation expressed by the law of prices of production the objective law of capitalist competition. According to this law, the more advanced the technology of the capital, the higher its share in the total surplus value.

Judging by the mentioned laws and regularities of capitalism, the wording under consideration is strange in its meaning, to say the least. It implies that competition should be global on the basis of low rather than high technology, and that global competition should be dominated by countries with the lowest and neocolonial capitalism rather than those with the highest and neo-industrial capitalism.

But it doesn't work that way. Obviously, the drafters of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 formulated their own wish from the standpoint of the oligarchic system rather than objective economic laws of modern capitalism.

The following definition of "major threat" is part of the same story: "the changing structure of world energy demand and the changing structure of its consumption, the development of energy-saving technology and reduction of materials intensity, the development of "green technology".

It is reasonable to wonder: who can be threatened by neo-industrial progress of the productive forces with large-scale development of post-oil technology, an increased "green" energy and reduction in material intensity of goods? Is it really a threat to those countries that have shifted to new science-intensive technetronic and digital industrialization? That is not so. New industrialization cannot be a threat to those countries that implement it. It becomes a threat only to those countries that have not reached the stage of neo-industrial development.

Technetronic industrialization is not a threat to advanced countries: it is only a threat to backward and dependent countries.

As we can see, the second formulation also turns everything upside down and shifts the focus from the backwardness of post-Soviet Russia to the power and neo-industrial progress of industrialized countries.

Is it possible to accept such mangled logic incorporated by the drafters in the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030? No, it is not. To accept it means to accept the substitution of the right benchmarks with wrong ones. The main threat to Russia's economic security is de-industrialization generated by a backward economic system, and therefore — an unacceptable lagging behind advanced and industrialized countries.

More specifically, chronic failure of post-Soviet Russia to adopt the new technetronic industrialization is the central challenge and the most severe threat to economic security of our country. While Russia preserves an economic system of a historically low type, we cannot rely on neo-industrial progress — that's the point.

The drafters, as we can see, protect the worthless system of power and property, and create its artificial defense by burying in oblivion the fundamental national interests of Russia and the urgent necessity for new technetronic industrialization.

The wordings mentioned above are followed by another one, which defines "major threat" (Item 12) as "the vulnerability of the financial system of the Russian Federation to global risks (including the effects of speculative foreign capital) and the vulnerability of the information infrastructure of the financial and banking system".

This definition again points out a negative impact from the outside, whereas the true reason lies in the fact that our domestic socioeconomic system is extremely backward. Foreign speculative capital was active in the Soviet times, but before *perestroika* it did not have a comprehensive capability to damage the Soviet economy and its development, because the commanding heights of the economy were in sovereign ownership.

Thus it is not about the speculative foreign capital. The reason lies in an obviously dependent economic system that allows the speculative capital to hold sway in our country like a conqueror. So the blame is not that of the foreign capital that seized the commanding heights of our economy, but that of the non-sovereign system of power and ownership, which allowed the foreign capital to seize the commanding heights of the domestic economy: property, banks, land, infrastructure, key industries, distribution networks, etc.

The same applies to the "vulnerability of the information infrastructure". This vulnerability is rooted in the strong dependence on foreign microprocessors, operating systems and digital technology, in the backwardness of technetronic innovation and developments, in the disruption of fundamental and applied science, in the destruction of production of computer-based means of production, in general — in large-scale de-industrialization caused by non-economic privatization of property and destruction of the planning and standard-based regulation of the ratios and growth rates of social reproduction.

All of the above is directly connected with the vicious domestic system-wide basis and the vicious system structure of post-Soviet Russia. But the position of the drafters of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 is different: they draw attention to the speck in another's eye without noticing the log in their own — in the form of the terrible consequences of unlimited power of a backward and unfit economic system.

In the end, according to the logic of the drafters, it turns out that the security of raw materials export system requires the termination of neo-industrial progress in industrialized countries. For compilers it would be ideal if industrialized countries descended to the same level of backwardness as post-Soviet Russia rather than Russia climbed up the stairs of technetronic progress.

### § 4. Phenomena without essence and effect without reasons?

The Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 still found a place for "major challenges and threats" of internal origin. But even if we only glance at them, we will see a rather strange approach, namely: there is a listing of phenomena and effects, but not one reason is specified.

It is noted, for example, "the absence of Russian non-resource companies among global leaders of the world economy". The question is: what is the reason for this "absence" And what must be done to ensure their "presence" there? What measures must be adopted and implemented? Unfortunately, the compilers have neither answers nor guesses in this respect.

Meanwhile, "global leaders" are exclusively representatives of multinational corporations, i.e. those that have a vertically integrated organizational structure and are embedded in global economic chains of production of goods with high added value. Global leadership belongs to "the economy of multinational corporations".

Leaders in the world economy are those countries whose economic system is in strict accordance with the law of vertical integration, with the law under which it is strictly forbidden to profit from intermediate production, and hence — from the extraction of raw materials and infrastructure monopolies.

Only an economic system that is subordinated to the mentioned law becomes

a system of multinational corporations, a system of "global leaders".

On the contrary, an economic system that contradicts this law remains fragmented and underdeveloped, and therefore dependent and uncompetitive; in other words — a global outsider. Such is the oligarchic system of post-Soviet Russia: it does not comply with the law of vertical integration and is a system of total backwardness — organizational, structural, scientific-technical, innovative, technological, infrastructural, human, social, environmental, etc.

The domestic economic science has long established a formula for modern socioeconomic progress: vertical integration plus neo-industrialization. So, from the point of view of this formula we have complete inaction. The government does not engage in vertical integration at all, it refuses to create full-fledged vertically integrated and diversified corporations specialized in the production of science intensive and competitive products of final demand, including exports. Moreover, under the guise of "reforms", the government authorized the destruction of the vertically integrated structure of strategic infrastructure electricity, railway transport, housing and utilities, etc.

In the framework of the oligarchic system the government was satisfied with the establishment of fictitious corporations that have neither vertical integration nor cross-sector interaction or inter-sectoral production chains of products with high added value; instead, there is private capitalist appropriation of income, similar to that in the offshore.

In our opinion, the scientific formula for modern socio-economic development is a strategic formula for real economic security of Russia: *vertical integration plus neo-industrialization*. To ensure economic security in our country, the domestic economic system should be brought into full compliance with the imperative requirements of the law of vertical integration. Actually, this should be policy measures aimed at reviving economic sovereignty and economic independence of Russia.

All the rest of the internal "major challenges and threats" listed in the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 are part of the phenomena and effects caused by the contradiction between the oligarchical economic system and the law of vertical integration.

The whole list of direct results of domination of the oligarchic system fits into a single phenomenon of *de-industrialization*:

- "insufficient investment in the real sector of the economy due to unfavorable investment climate, high business costs, excessive administrative barriers, ineffective protection of property rights";
- "weak innovation activity, backwardness in the development and implementation of new and emerging technologies (including technologies of the digital economy), lack of qualifications and key competences of employees";

- "depletion of the resource base of fuel and raw materials industries as the fields become exhausted";
- "limited scale of Russian non-oil export due to its low competitiveness, underdeveloped market infrastructure and insufficient engagement in global chains of added value":
- "slow economic growth due to internal factors including limited access to long-term financial resources and insufficient development of transport and energy infrastructure";
- "imbalances in the national budget system";
- "lack of efficient public administration";
- "high level of criminalization and corruption in the economic sphere";
- "significant proportion of shadow economy";
- "strengthening of differentiation of the population by income level";
- "decline in the quality and availability of education, medical care and, as a consequence, decline in the quality of human potential";
  - "insufficient labor resources";
- "uneven spatial development of the Russian Federation, strengthening of differentiation of regions and municipalities by level and pace of socio-economic development".

Any position in this list (Item 12) is a direct consequence of the oligarchic system. But the drafters demonstrate their unwillingness to shift from effects to causes.

Moreover, they make some completely false statements that cannot be left without critical consideration.

Let us consider the argument about "insufficient engagement in global chains of added value". It is not just questionable, but absolutely wrong. And it is wrong from both actual and theoretical aspects.

First, domestic intermediate production is excessively involved in the "global" value added chains. The only question concerns its role there. It is involved as intermediate resource units in the chains of multinational corporations.

This engagement results in the fact that the domestic economy is now subordinate to the dollar tolling system under which the imperialism of the dollar possesses the entire cost of production, resulting in the fact that the wages is what mainly remains inside our country. By the way, this was the reason for the current investment crisis, not because of some ephemeral "investment climate", which is invariably blamed by financial speculators in order to justify the export of money capital.

In general, involvement in "global" chains is quite significant. If we do not see this, do not understand that the dollar tolling system arranged by the dominance of oligarchic power and property "washes out" capital investment and recreates autonomous recession, then we are led by false assessments and rely on false targets.

Second, it is fundamentally erroneous to rely on the fact of embedding into foreign chains of added value. Such an illusion can only be shared by those who do not understand the vertically integrated structure of multinational corporations and their internal mechanism.

Let us only state a well-known fact of separating profit center and research center from costs and expenses center. If someone is embedded in someone else's value chain, then he is automatically transferred to the costs and expenses center, thus being excluded from the profit center, R&D, investment, innovation, and high technology centers. This kind of embedding is equivalent to the embedding of a beggar in an unfamiliar monastery.

Let us face it: the position of "embedding" in the chains of foreign multinational corporations, which is advocated by the comprador retro-liberals and shared for some unknown reason by the compilers of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030, is in direct conflict with strategic and geopolitical interests of Russia.

The national interests of Russia can be supported by another position — the position of forming our own multinational corporations, our own diversified chains of producing science intensive and competitive products with high added value.

It is the lack of our own "economy of multinational corporations" that places our country in danger associated with backwardness in all key areas of scientific, technological and socio-economic progress.

The same reason explains the "weak innovation activity, a lag in the development

and implementation of new and emerging technology (including technology of the digital economy)". The oligarchic economic system is characterized by complete disintegration, and therefore belongs to the class of disintegrated economies.

Meanwhile, scientific and technological progress in the era of new technetronic industrialization finds its driving force only in vertically integrated corporations that connect the mining and processing of raw materials, science and manufacturing, production and marketing, links of group "A" and group "B". If there are no vertically integrated corporations and multinational economy, then there can be no scientific progress, no innovation, no high technology or higher technical structure of industrial capital.

It is useless to demand innovation activity, development and implementation of effective technology from an economic system that is not in compliance with the law of vertical integration. In essence, a disintegrated system has no driving force represented either by scientific and technological or economic and social progress. Such an economic system does not have incentives for expanded reproduction, enhancement of the technological structure of industrial capital, reduction of economic costs, saturation of the domestic market, and improvement of the product quality.

In short, an economic system similar to the oligarchic one is completely devoid of incentives to any progress: scientific, technological, environmental, or social.

By the way, the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 mentions "digital economy" three times (Items 16-18). It is made in the manner of hasty and formal insertion, counting on the use of the term that is intended to enter the political rhetoric of the Kremlin. In industrialized countries this term is outdated; now they speak about the "fourth industrial revolution" because they understand that "digital economy" will not be implemented, first, without industrial production, and second, without the digital industry. For example, Germany considers the need to connect the real economy with a "digital" one<sup>1</sup>.

The most correct understanding of the relationship between industry and digital technology is found in the neo-industrial paradigm developed by the domestic economic science. Within this paradigm, "digital economy" appears as a result of a new, digital and technetronic industrialization. Without the digital industrialization of the productive forces, "digital economy" is doomed to be only an illusion. It appears that the understanding of this fact leads industrialized countries to change their landmarks and embark on the course of the next industrial revolution.

Finally, it is impossible not to note the absurdity of the fact that the following factors are included in "major challenges and threats": "establishment of redundant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Next Production Revolution: Implications for Governments and Business. Paris: OECD, 2017. P. 28.

requirements in the field of environmental security; increasing the costs of meeting environmental standards of production and consumption".

The drafters of the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 in this item are again at odds with actual state of affairs. What and whose "excessive requirements in the field of environmental security" are meant here, given the fact that throughout the country there is now a catastrophic environmental situation, and the mortality due to the abnormal environmental situation sets record after record, especially in metropolitan areas and million-plus cities? What is the use of the requirements that are not fulfilled? And how can the overcoming of ecological disaster be identified with the threat to economic security, if on the contrary, ensuring environmental friendliness of workplaces, technologies and production provides one of the most important conditions of economic security?

Besides, most importantly, environmental safety is not ensured by administrative requirements, but by resource recycling,

industrial system for collecting and recycling household and industrial waste, and organization of a closed resource cycle. It is possible to create resources recycling sector only on the basis of high technology. In particular, to automate the sorting of industrial waste requires technology with the use of specialized robots and artificial intelligence devices. Therefore, enhancing ecological safety goes hand in hand with the economic security of the country, rather than contradict it.

We will not provide any more examples of poorly-designed and poorly formed sentences. In our view, the inefficient Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period till 2030 represents the maximum of what a comprador system of power and property is capable.

Of course, economic sovereignty and economic security are both of critical importance for our country. But they are achievable only when the dependent economic system is replaced by a sovereign, vertically integrated, planned and regulated system, and if major new high-tech, digital, and technetronic industrialization is implemented nationwide.

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