SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

# Current State and Prospects of Family Policy in Russia: Socio-Demographic Analysis

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Abstract. The goal of the work is to analyze the measures and expected results of the state family policy, including the activities of the national project "Demography" (2018), affecting the interests of the family, which allows us to determine the prospects of family policy. The article is based on the analysis of state documents on the strategy of demographic and family policy, official statistics, population censuses and sample surveys of Rosstat. We identify the effectiveness of family policy measures taking into account the differentiation of socio-demographic development of regions. To do this, we use methods of descriptive statistics and multidimensional data analysis — dispersion and cluster analysis. The cluster analysis makes it possible to form typological groups of regions depending on the dynamics of fertility, poverty level and the development of the preschool care system — the most important indicators characterizing the implementation of family policy strategy. Economic support measures, the effectiveness of which has been proven in a number of studies conducted in countries around the world, are very important for Russian families. However, the impact of these measures has its own specific features in connection with the differentiation of economic development of regions, opportunities for the development of social infrastructure, and maintenance of a decent standard of living for families with children; it is important to take all this into account in the development of family policy. The analysis of the effectiveness of family policy suggests the need to change the structure of implemented measures. Family policy should be long-term and systemic; it should be aimed at creating conditions that increase the independence of the family in modern society and economic relations. Often, in the course of formation of a strategy for activities in the field of family policy, there is no clear link between the goals of activities and indicators of its achievement. Complex issues that need to be addressed in the interests of the family (for example, providing opportunities for parents to combine family and professional roles) and that need to unite the efforts of various actors, including employers, remain outside the focus of family policy. The intersection of activities and expected results does not allow us to assess the effectiveness of individual strategic documents in the field of family policy.

Key words: the institution of the family, family policy, birth rate, demographic policy, effectiveness of family policy, national project "Demography".

Introduction

Socio-demographic policy in Russia is one of primary elements of the country's economic development strategy. Primary goal of population's reproduction governance is country's provision with necessary labor resources. Important forms of social life depend on it: economy, life quality of various social classes, country's defense capacity. In achieving the goal of required population growth at the expense of the birth rate growth, tools and measures of demographic policy intersect with family policy's set of instruments, aimed at supporting life of the family institution and implementing its basic, including reproductive, functions. Therefore, it is difficult to divide measures of demographic and family policy in many situations of government policy. It is especially critical for solutions aimed at strengthening of marital relations and intergenerational connections. The actualization of the process of introducing measures, which were recently formally included in program documents of Russian demographic policy, into social practice in Russia, in fact, affects the sphere of institutional support of the family — family policy.

Awareness of the family institution's role in the society's life has significantly influenced the creation of new family policy's strategy, taking into account the ongoing changes of Russia's socio-political and economic spheres. It also caused the search for the most reasonable methods of evaluating its effectiveness.

Concept of State Family Policy until 2025[1] was an important step of state family policy development. It continued the policy of providing systemic support to families, especially families with children, which began with the "maternity capital" program in 2007: when a second, third or a subsequent child is born or adopted, the family is given the opportunity to receive a significant sum of money (in 2017 – 453 thousand rubles) for purposeful usage (mother's pension, children's education, house purchase)[2]. Previous strategic documents on family policy's implementation, adopted in Russia at the end of the 20th century[3], were focused on the specifics of the family situation in the conditions of socio-economic and political crisis and did not take into account long-term trends in the family institution's transformation.

There is a clear correlation between Concept of Family Policy, adopted in 2014, Concept of Demographic Policy in the Russian Federation until 2025[4], Concept of Long-term Economic Development of the Russian Federation until 2020[5] in relation to objectives, areas, and expected results within family support. Program documents, adopted later ("National Action Strategy for Women"[6], "Decade of Childhood 2018–2027"[7]) are also heavily connected with Concept of State Family Policy in Activity Areas. Among the problems, related to the functioning of a family, first of all, attention is paid to decreasing number of children in families, increase of childless families' number, and reduction of stability in family relations. Expected results are an increase of general and total fertility coefficients, decrease of divorces. Among the measures aimed at increasing birth rates, there are plans for the development of a system of pre-school education and supervision, the provision, if necessary, of retraining and employment for women, who start working after maternity leave.

In accordance with the President's Decree no. 204 "On National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation through to 2024", dated May 7, 2018, the National project "Demography" was developed. It could be seen as the next step in the process of advancing initiatives from previously adopted demographic development and family support's programs. This project implies the achievement of the following objectives: to raise Russians' healthy life expectancy to 67 years, to boost total birth rate to 1.7 children per 1 woman, and to increase the number of people who lead a healthy lifestyle. National "Demography"

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[1] On the approval of Concept of State Family Policy in Russian Federation until 2025: Decree of the RF Government no. 1618-p., dated August 25, 2014.

[2] On additional measures of state support for families with children: Federal Law no. 256-FL, dated December 29, 2006.

[3] Concept of State Family Policy – 1993; Main areas of state family policy: Decree of the RF President no. 712, dated May 14, 1996.

[4] On the approval of Concept of Demographic Policy in the Russian Federation until 2025: Decree of the RF President no. 1351, dated October 9, 2007. Available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_165069/

[5] On Concept of Long-term Economic Development of the Russian Federation until 2020: Decree of the RF Government no. 1662-p, dated November 17, 2008. Available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_90601/

[6] On approval of National Action Strategy for Women for 2017–2022: Decree of the RF Government no. 410-p, dated March 8, 2017.

[7] On the declaration of the Decade of Childhood in the Russian Federation: Decree of the RF President no. 240, dated May 29, 2017.

project will be implemented in five areas, two of which directly affect families' lives: "Financial support for families after the birth of a child" and "Promotion of employment opportunities for women – creation of pre-school education available to children up to three years of age". It is assumed that such activities will let boosting total birth coefficient to 1.7 children until 2024.

The increase of the birth rate is expected to be achieved by old measures, which have been active in Russia for several years, and the ones recently included in state strategic document.

Thus, the project will continue the program of so-called "maternity capital". Besides, monthly payments to families in need (low-income) who gave birth (adopted) to a child, the provision of mortgage loans on preferential terms (6% of annual percent) to families with two or more children, payments after giving birth to a third child or subsequent children (until a child is 3 years old) remain relevant.

It is planned to increase the scope of activities aimed at retraining and improving the skills of women during the maternal leave with a child under three years old, creating of additional places in kindergartens and nurseries for children under three years old in state and non-state sectors of pre-school education.

The project's innovations include the increased number of extracorporal fertilizations (up to 450 thousand per year) at the expense of basic program of mandatory medical insurance. It should affect the growth of fertility and reduce the number of childless couples. Special attention is given to informational aspect: creation of TV-programs, Internet-content, published periodicals implementing programs aimed at propaganda of family values, support of motherhood and childhood. As previously noted, proposed measures significantly affect not only the regulation of demographic processes and reproduction but also the functioning of the family institution.

The goal of this work is the analysis of expected results of the National "Demography" project implementation within proposed measures related to families' interests. It will let us draw certain conclusions about possible effectiveness of the National project in relation to the family institution's support taking into account already implemented measures and significant regional differentiation of demographic processes and models of family life. Primary subjects of the analysis are measures that fall within the competence of family and demographic policy.

The search for the most efficient models of family policy is the subject of research in many countries of the world: Russia is not an exception. Implementation of the National project "Demography" will heavily define the nature of family policy in the following years: at least, in the context of supporting the reproductive, educational, and self-preservation family functions.

Thus, it is essential to evaluate the approaches used in the project in order to achieve the effect of family policy. The authors focus on the effectiveness of family policy measures implemented after 2008 – during the period of family policy activation in Russia, the implementation of the Concept of state family policy. This allows us to identify how innovative, in relation to the implemented family policy strategy, the national project is, and why earlier measures were not enough.

The examination of the National project "Demography" structure raises several research issues. What is the logic of forming a system of indicators and their quantitative values? How objectively will proposed indicators reflect the results of the project, if there is an intersection of activity areas with other program documents of family and demographic policy and the necessity to take into account Russian families' needs? Is it possible to evaluate the

effectiveness of implemented policies and individual programs on the basis of approved performance indicators, and how effective is it? How receptive are families to implemented policy measures? What are the prospects of the effectiveness of this National project?

If we speak about evaluating the effectiveness of family policy, it is necessary to take into account the fact that a Russian family model is very mosaic. The main indicators of its demographic and social development, which are reflected as expected results in strategic documents of family policy, are differentiated by country's regions. Accordingly, implemented measures are very different in terms of effectiveness. It should be taken into account in the process of developing regional family policy strategies and its effectiveness' evaluation.

The scientific novelty of the work is the review of indicators of the effectiveness of a number of Russian family policy program documents. They were adopted in recent years and allow us to get an idea about certain aspects of a family situation in country's regions. An objective assessment of family policy effectiveness is possible only in a system. The analysis of the effectiveness of individual measures of various policy documents leads to process' excessive formalization and does not provide a reliable picture. The use of statistical analysis methods allowed us to identify the alignment of birth rates, despite existing regional differentiation of family models and family policy in Russia. Also, it let us include the need to address issues of families' economic independence and the formation of a "family—work" balance (along with measures provided by the national project) in the discourse on the prospects of family policy effectiveness. The authors believe that it is impossible to talk about achieving the birth rate targets of the national project "Demography" without implementing

these measures in various Russian regions. At the same time, low living standards of families with children make them susceptible to economic support measures, the size of which is still insufficient.

Methodology of the research

The article is based on the analysis of state documents, devoted to the strategy of family and demographic policy, data of All-Russia population censuses (2002 и 2010[8]), micro-census of 2015[9], official statistics[10] and selective Rosstat studies: in particular, the Complex study of population's living conditions[11] (conducted in 2016, the sample population was 134,852 thousand people, data are representative for all Russian regions), Selective observation of population's reproductive plans[12] (conducted in 2017, sample population − 15 thousand households).

To identify the effectiveness of family policy measures and differentiation of socio-demographic development of regions, methods of descriptive statistics, as well as methods of multivariate statistical data analysis, in particular dispersive and cluster analysis, were used. The use of the cluster analysis method makes it possible to group the studied objects by several features at the same time. The method of cluster analysis allowed us to form typological

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[8] Data of 2002 All-Russia population census. Available at: http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=18; Data of 2010 All-Russia population census. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm

[9] Data of 2015 Russia population micro-census. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/micro-perepis/finish/micro-perepis.html

[10] Official web-page of Rosstat Available at: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#

[11] Results of the Complex study of population's living conditions, 2016. Official web-page of Rosstat. Available at: //http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/KOUZ16/index.html(accessed: 14.05.2019).

[12] Selective observation of population's reproductive plans data, 2017. Official Rosstat web-page. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/RPN17/index.html

groups of Russian regions (83 regions) depending on the dynamics of birth rate, poverty level, and development of pre-school care system. It let us to formulate conclusions about different impact of family policy measures on regions with specifics of demographic and socio-economic development.

Approaches to assessing effectiveness of family policy

Effectiveness of family policy is largely determined by the extent to which the strategy of activity takes into account trends of transformation and characteristics of the family institution [1, p. 103]. A modern family is based on a model of demographic behavior, characterized by a flexible approach to choosing a life path, a variety of different lifestyles [2]. Research in the field of family policy methodology and practice in many countries is aimed at finding efficient models of family policy and evaluating the effectiveness of measures taken, factors that determine families' need for certain support measures.

On the one hand, the analysis of family policy in countries of Central and Eastern Europe allows researchers to form its typology and draw a conclusion about the fertility decline, which has not been prevented by family policy so far [3]. However, this result, although it might have a debatable nature, does not cancel the search for promising methods and measures of family policy implementation. Researchers from many countries of the world are puzzled by the search for efficient measures of family policy. The most important study area is the search for valid methods for evaluating the effectiveness of implemented measures [4, p. 68; 5, p. 112], including demographic policy measures that significantly affect interests of families with children [6, p. 60, pp. 44–47; 7, p. 60; 8; 9; 10]. However, this problem raises a methodological issue on the possibility of evaluating effectiveness.

Among the measures of family policy, researchers highlight measures of economic support for families with children, as well as the creation of conditions for combining family and professional responsibilities of parents. The analysis of social measures showed that, if the number of children attending preschool institutions increases by 20 %, the fertility of a cohort increases by 0.05 children. A number of studies have noted "extremely strong positive relationship between fertility and proper organization of child care services" [11; 12, p. 230]. Research in Spain, based on data from the European Community Household Panel for 1994–2001, confirmed the positive impact of the availability of childcare facilities on women's reproductive behavior [13, pp. 837–840].

The dependence between family income and birth rate is revealed. It is manifested in different ways in countries with different levels of economic development. Analysis of the relationship between economic development and fertility shows that the inverse J-shaped model exists (the birth rate growth on a certain level of income), but only after reaching a certain level of economic development and per capita income in the country [14].

A.H. Gauthier and J. Hatzius conduct an econometric analysis of the dependence between family benefits and fertility [15]. However, children's benefits are taken into account by families only when it makes up at least 10% of the total family income and is provided for a long time [16]. It should be noted that the vast majority of benefits in Russia do not meet these requirements.

Studies prove the need to take into account the "family–work" balance in family policy [17, p. 415; 18, p. 400]. At the same time, integral indicators are developed to assess the effectiveness of family policy. In particular, the Family policy index: it is based on such

characteristics as the provision of educational services by countries, parental leave, and economic transfers to support families with children under 3 years old – these are the most important characteristics of the modern family policy model [19].

Considering the work-life balance to be a significant factor of the family policy effectiveness, on the basis of data analysis from 26 European countries, the authors propose the calculation of the National work-life balance index which is a combination of five characteristics: time/schedule; work; family; health; policy [20]. These characteristics take into account the context, the environment in which modern families exist.

In addition to identifying the importance of implemented measures, such as assistance to a family in children care and their upbringing, research has shown that family policy in European countries is often aimed at the support of a "modernized" family lifestyle [21, pp. 915–917]. G. Esping Andersen and F.C. Billari come to the conclusion that the spread of gender-egalitarian norms might help reverse the trend of declining fertility and marriage [22, p. 18]. Family model does not remain unchanged; the family institute, being one of the oldest social institutes, is changing and experiencing the impact of a set of cultural, economic, and social factors. A study, conducted in European Union countries, let us conclude that, by promoting role compatibility and reducing gender costs of child's upbringing, family policy leads to an increase of the birth rate and leveling of the fertility differences depending on the level of mothers' education [22; 23].

These conclusions are true for many countries. The analysis, based on data from 42 countries, showed that countries with leading fertility and well-being rates stick to family policy that encourages combining parental responsibilities with employment and egalitarianism in the distribution of family responsibilities [24].

In particular, Northern Europe countries and France have developed some kind of a "support continuum" in order to assist parents during the first years of a child's life. This means providing paid parental leave, access to affordable and accessible pre-school facilities for children, and taking care of primary school age children who do not go to school. This policy has been implemented since the 1970s, creating a stable family-friendly environment in which parents are confident in their decision to have more children. This policy started in the 1970s and creates stable, favorable family environment which gives parents confidence in their decision to have more children. At the same time, there is a division of responsibility for the management of household activities and children's upbringing within the family itself, which also affects reproductive aspirations. The situation is very different in different countries. For example, while French and Korean women perform almost 4 hours of unpaid housework a day, French men help around the house for almost two and a half hours a day, while Korean men, on average, devote 45 minutes of their time [25, p. 170; 26; 27].

Despite the common goal, methods of assistance are different. Finland and Sweden have policies that ensure continuous support for parents until their children reach adolescence: flexible parental leave, affordable high-quality child care services, and reduced working hours for parents with young children. Canada and the UK opted for lower tax rates compared to higher costs of social services, although both countries have recently begun expanding parents' assistance.

The problem faced by researchers and management of social policy is caused not only by multidimensional functioning of a modern family, its relationships with other social institutions, but also by the complexity of measures implemented in families' interests within various areas of social activity.

The synergistic effect of family policy measures poses methodological difficulties for researchers who aim to evaluate each of these measures separately. In particular, revealing the influence of state policy on the birth rate in Sweden, J. Walker concludes that "they [parental benefits] are strongly linked to women's wages combined with constant changes of income tax laws and other wage-related factors, making it impossible to assess the impact of parental benefits separately" [25]. A similar situation is typical of Russia. O.G. Isupova believes that it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of family policy measures, since it is very difficult to offer a reasonable calculation mechanism. Moreover, birth rate changes can be explained by other processes occurring in society simultaneously with the introduction of family policy measures [26]. At the very least, it is difficult to identify the impact of individual programs and concepts on increasing fertility.

Recent actualization of Russian family policy and the formation of a unified logic of strategic documents led to the search for methods of evaluating the effectiveness of measures taken and identifying the most efficient ones. At the same time, the authors' opinions differ in the assessment of the Russian family policy model. A.A. Tkachenko in his work notes the duality of Russian family policy [27, p. 50]. The author assesses the current policy of birth rate stimulation as the support of low-income families.

E.V. Kochkina, after analyzing the system of indicators and evaluating the effectiveness of Russian social policy in 2012—2015, concluded that there is the inefficiency of public expenditures on families and children's support. Perhaps, the inefficiency of family policy is caused by irrational spending of funds [28, p. 155].

Nowadays, the effectiveness of existing policy measures concerning family planning and birth support is often questioned [29]. A number of authors, in particular M.V. Andreev, S.V. Zakharov [30], believe that sample studies' data do not allow us to speak about the significant effectiveness of modern Russian policy's measures aimed at increasing the birth rate.

Special attention is given to the assessment of the "maternity capital" program's impact on birth rate increase in 2007—2015, although this topic is quite debatable. In this period of time, Russian policy was aimed at stimulation of birth rates and families' reproductive function through the "maternity capital" program. During the analysis of the effectiveness of recent Russian demographic policy measures (in particular, the introduction of so-called "maternity capital" for stimulation of the birth of the 2nd and subsequent children in 2007), a retrospective forecast of the special birth coefficient for 2007—2008, based on 1987—2006 data, was conducted. The calculation of hypothetical number of births for 2007 and 2008, with the condition that age-related birth rates remained at the 2006 level, showed that the actual number of births in 2007 was 8.3%, higher, in 2008 — by 15.2%, than it could have been, if the previously existing trends had been preserved [31].

The impact of introduced "maternity capital" program on birth increase in Russia is defined in the work written by F. Slonimczyk and A.Yurko — per 0.15 children based on the value of the total fertility rate [32, p. 270].

However, E. Borozdina, A. Rotkirch, and A. Temkina believe that everything is not so clear, and Russian women and families do not believe in the "maternity capital" program and Russian social policy, because it sends contradictory messages [33]. Apparently, we can say that the effect of the program "maternity capital" has exhausted itself. It is worth thinking about the introduction of systemic support measures that take into account the current situation of a family and Russians' lifestyle.

Thus, L.A. Popova [34, p. 85] speaks about the effectiveness of federal and regional family capital programs in ensuring the reproduction regime of country's population, but, at the same time, she emphasizes the need to take measures within the framework of demographic and family policy that ensure the economic independence of families, without which the family institution will not be able to fully function.

V.V. Elizarov, after analyzing goals of family policy until 2024, concludes that it is necessary to differentiate target values for regions and to outline annual dynamics of target values as realistically as possible [36]. Of course, family life models are regionally differentiated, but it is not exactly necessary to consider the approach, which includes such details of target values in relation to population's reproductive behavior, to assessing effectiveness of family policy optimal.

Speaking about the prospects of family policy, A.I. Antonov [35] believes that the effectiveness of family and demographic policy can only be achieved through increasing the value of family and child lifestyle. However, how can this be achieved? We need a truly scientific justification of the strategy of family and demographic policies, which is not declarative and takes into account the complexity of the demographic behavior of a modern man. The value of a family is determined by the attitude of society to it, the place it occupies in a person's life, and the role that a family plays in the system of life priorities. In order to be effective, family policy must have long-term, systemic nature and be aimed at creating conditions that enable the family institution to function and meet needs of families within modern society and patterns of economic relations.

In many cases, in the process of forming a strategy of activities concerning Russian family policy, there is no clear link between the goals of activity and indicators of its achievement. Also, there is no justification of target indicators' values. Complex issues that need to be addressed in family's interests, such as enabling parents to combine family and professional roles, creating a "family—work" balance, and requirement to combine efforts of various actors, including employers, remain outside the scope of family policy. This probably explains the lack of effectiveness of implemented programs and measures.

Speaking about the assessment of family policy by its recipients, Russian researchers say that people, in general, appreciate measures related to monetary payments more. They include interest-free loans (money received immediately, and it is not necessary to think for awhile about paying back), federal and regional maternity (family) capital, monthly payments for each child up until they are three years old, and monthly subsistence payments for the third and each subsequent child [37, p. 260]. In a certain degree, this situation was caused by low living standards of families with several children. It makes such families very susceptible to economic support measures.

For families in Russia, just like for other countries, economic measures of support, efficiency of which was proven in many projects, implemented by researchers in different countries, are very important. Its impact on Russian families has its own specifics

due to significant differentiation of regions' economic development, its opportunities to develop social infrastructure and support decent living standards among families with children. However, transformation of the family institute in Russia moves in the same direction as in other countries. It shows the necessity to solve modern family problems with methods of family policy. It is the creation of conditions for the successful functioning of a family with several children that will help to increase the value of family lifestyle.

Effectiveness of family policy in Russia

Family policy measures, aimed at increasing the reproductive potential of Russian families, including the payment of "maternity capital", in some way affected the dynamics of fertility and the structure of families. However, despite the increase of the birth rate, which continued until 2016, according to the structure of households, a significant part of families have only one child, although the share of such families has decreased. By 2015 (according to the micro-census of the population), the share of single-child households decreased to 59.8% (65.5% in 2010), while the share of two-child households increased to 31.1% (27.5% in 2010) and three-child households – to 9.1% (2010 – 7.0%).

Besides, the relative number of full families (with two parents) has increased among family households: if in 2002 the number of full families was 3 times higher than the number of single-parent families (incomplete families), the excess reached 3.3 times in 2015. The number of children, born in a registered marriage, is increasing: while in 2005 the proportion of children, born out of marriage, reached almost 30%, it had fallen to 21% by 2016[13].

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[13] Calculated according to: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia-2017. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B17_16/Main.htm

However, long-term trends continue. The birth rate is getting old. The average age of a mother at birth continues to increase. If the average age of mothers, who gave birth to their first child before 1994, was 19.1 years, it increased to 26.6 years by 2015–2017. Over the same period, the average protogenetic interval (the period from marriage to the birth of the first child) increased by 3 times.

The main indicator of the effectiveness (expected result) of the National project "Demography" is the total fertility rate – the number of children born by a woman during her entire reproductive age (15–49 years). However, this indicator, like several others, was proposed for evaluating the effectiveness of Concept of State Family Policy in 2014 (*Figure*).

The total fertility coefficient, which is one of the most important demographic indicators, was 1.75 children per 1 woman of reproductive age in 2014. Its growth began in 2006, a few years before the adoption of Concept. By 2017, the indicator had dropped to 1.62 due to demographic (shifts in the birth calendar) and economic factors. The value of the indicator is still far from the level that provides, at least, a simple reproduction of the population (2.1–2.2 children). According to Rosstat's forecast, which takes into account trends in fertility, mortality, and the gender, age structure of the population, by 2024, the total fertility rate, depending on the forecast version, will be between 1.54 to 1.74 children. At the same time, the goal of the National project "Demography" is to increase the indicator to 1.7 children. In this regard, the contribution of the National project, along with the measures taken in accordance with the Plan of implementation of Concept of state family policy, to increasing the birth rate is not very clear.

Data from a Selective survey of the population's reproductive plans, conducted by

Indicators of expected results of state family policy

Growth of the total fertility coefficient

Decrease of the share of families with children below 16 years old in the total number of families whose total per capita income is lower than the established subsistence level in an entity of the Russian Federation

Increase of the number of children below 3 years old provided with pre-school education and childcare services

The achievement of positive dynamics of demographic indicators

Rosstat in 2017, showed that 11.5% of women decided to give birth to their first child, who they would not afford without "maternity capital", 15.6% of women gave a similar response in relation to the second child, and 19.5% — in relation to the third one. The calculation, based on data on the distribution of birth numbers in 2007—2017 by the order of birth, showed that state support measures in the form of "maternity capital" gave a 15% increase of birth numbers in this period (2.9 million births). It can be assumed that the extension of the "maternity capital" program until 2021 will allow achieving the set goals — the value of the total coefficient of 1.7 children (to overcome the negative impact of the structural factor in the following years — the reduction of the number of reproductive age women). The number of women of reproductive age (15—49 years) (according to Rosstat forecast)[14] will decrease by 2.8—3.5% by 2024: especially, the

number of young women. Even if the birth rate remains at the level of 2016, the number of births will be reduced by 20—36%. Such prospects show the need for serious actions in the area of family support.

Another indicator of state family policy's expected results is the percentage of families with children living below the poverty line. It should be noted that the poverty level among families with children continued to increase. For example, the percentage of children under the age of 16 (18) who live in households with per capita income below the subsistence level increased from 20.7% in 2014 to 25.9% by 2017. It was the significant level of poverty of Russians that required the adoption of a specialized program.

The development of so-called flexible labor market should be a priority: people with family obligations should not be deprived of the opportunity to implement their professional potential. Referring to data from the Comprehensive survey of population's living conditions, it might be noted that 25.4% of women, who look for work, would like to get a part-time job.

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[14] Calculated according to: Population by one-year age group. Forecast. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#

Besides, unresolved issues in the sphere of care for children, elderly people, disabled persons, and a general lack of social infrastructure have a negative impact on demographic indicators: family members become responsible for taking care of children and disabled family members. A comprehensive survey of population's living conditions, conducted by Rosstat in 2016, shows that 36.9% of women and 24.6% of men take care of their children every day, 6.7% of women and 4.1% of men take care of disabled people on the daily basis. Women with children spend 34.8 hours a week looking after them. This number is comparable to the length of a working week. Men spend 18.3 hours a week doing the same activities — it is almost two times less.

In 2014, the provision of preschool education for children, aged from 1 to 6, was 64.6%; in 2017, three years after the beginning of Concept of state family policy, it was 66.5%. The provision of places in pre-school educational organizations for children, including child care and supervision, increased from 612 to 633 places per 1000 children in 2014—2017[15]. It should be noted that measures for development of pre-school education system and the division with the family of pre-school children raising function were provided within the framework of not only Concept of state family policy, but also within Russian National Children's Strategy for 2012—2017, "Decade of Childhood" initiative, National Action Strategy for Women (2017—2022), roadmap "Changes in social sectors aimed at improving the efficiency of education and science".

In 2017, the number of pre-school students reached 7477.9 thousand people, which was 66.1% of all children, aged between 1—6 years.

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[15] According to Rosstat data. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/motherhood/#

It is clear that not all parents consider their children's visits to kindergarten the best option. In 2016, 47.8% of parents, whose children do not go to kindergartens, believed that "the child is better at home". During the implementation of Concept, the percentage of children who do not attend preschool institutions due to lack of places has decreased. In 2014, 23.4% of children, aged between 3—6 years, did not attend pre-school educational organizations due to lack of places: in 2016, this number decreased to 10.3%. However, the problem of the shortage of places in pre-school educational institutions remains unsolved.

We might conclude that, on the one hand, the same indicators measure the effectiveness of several strategic programs, aimed at solution of demographic problems and families' assistance. However, the problem of availability of pre-school education and child-care services remains. It affects the reproductive behavior of Russians, creates a "family — work" conflict of interests, and distorts the structure of employment, especially for women. The scale of poverty remains significant, and the risk of becoming poor people is still higher for families with children than for other population categories. We can hardly expect a significant increase of the birth rate in the following years. Taking into account the duplication of indicators of expected results in various strategic documents on family policy, it is not possible to correctly assess the effectiveness of any individual initiative. It can only be about the effectiveness of the whole state policy.

Regional differentiation of family policy indicators

There are significant differences in the level and dynamics of indicators, which are analyzed as primary indicators of family policy effectiveness. It goes for demographic and socio-economic characteristics.

Russian regions are differentiated according to the level of poverty among households with children (*Tab. 1*). The poverty level among families with children is much higher than average indicator for the whole population (2017 − 13.2%).

Table 1. The level of poverty among households with children, 2016

Share (%) of households with children below the poverty line	Number of regions
Less than 10	3
11–20	7
20–25	16
25–30	14
30–35	23
35–40	9
More than 40	13
Source: calculated according to the Comprehensive survey of population's living conditions. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/KOUZ16/index.html (accessed: 14.03.2019).	

In 2016, in 13 regions of the country, the poverty level of households was higher than 40% (the Republic of North Ossetia − Alania, the Republic of Buryatia, the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, the Kurgan Oblast, the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Chechen Republic, the Pskov Oblast, the Republic of Crimea, the Altai Republic, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Tyva Republic). In more than a half of country's regions, the poverty level among families with children was more than 30%.

Of course, there is a correlation between the birth rate and standards of living in Russian regions. A relatively higher birth rate is accompanied by an increase of poverty due to the increased load dependency with low incomes. Families with children's low standards of living with make them susceptible to economic support measures.

The most important factor, influencing the family's ability to implement their reproductive plans, is the development of social infrastructure that provides child care and helps resolve the "family−work" conflict for working parents. The availability of places in pre-school institutions has increased in recent years and continues to increase.

The dispersion analysis showed that hypotheses about the impact of the poverty level (F criterion is 2.345, the significance level p=0.045) and coverage of pre-school institutions (F-criterion is 3.325, the significance level p=0.049) on the change of the birth rate in Russian regions are not rejected. The birth rate in regions with different levels of poverty and the development of pre-school care and education differ.

In other words, the birth rate in country's regions fluctuates, as do the level of poverty and the availability of pre-school education. It is not possible to speak unequivocally about the direct impact of socio-economic factors on the birth rate. Most likely, it is about differences in the birth rate models and the socio-economic situation in regions.

The cluster analysis, carried out by the K-mediums method, made it possible to form typological groups of Russian regions in terms of fertility dynamics and measures of demographic and family policy. This method was successfully applied to the study of a family situation and family policy [38, p. 1179]. The use of the cluster analysis method showed that, in the context of the impact on the birth rate, a major role is played by the growth dynamics of the provision of places in preschool institutions, rather than achieved level.

The cluster analysis, conducted for 83 Russian regions, showed that they can be divided into 4 clusters on the basis of data:

X_1 — total fertility rate (number of children born by 1 woman during the entire reproductive period), 2017;

X_2 – poverty level among families with children (percentage of households with children below the poverty line,%), 2016;

X_3 – growth rate of pre-school education provision for children, aged 1−6 years (% from the number of children aged 1−6 years), 2017/2008, %;

X_4 – growth rate of the total fertility coefficient, 2017/2008, %.

The cluster analysis was performed using the Ward method. Due to different measurement units, data for studied indicators was pre-standardized.

The hypothesis on the equality of dispersions within and between clusters is rejected for all variables with 3 and 79 degrees of freedom. The value of the p-probability of error, while accepting the hypothesis of variance inequality, is extremely low, no more than 0.001 (the F-criterion is important for all variables at the level of, at least, 0.001). This allows us to say that the hypothesis of variances inequality is accepted and, accordingly, the clusters are formed correctly.

The distribution of regions by clusters and average values of variables are shown in *Tables 2* and *3*. The analysis of variables' values in clusters shows that the growth rate of fertility after 2008 was higher in regions where the poverty level was lower. At the same time, the birth rate increased more intensively, where the initial level of the total birth rate was lower. In other words, there was an increase in the number of first and third births.

On the contrary, the availability of places for children in pre-school institutions increased more intensively in regions, where the initial availability of pre-school education and supervision services was the lowest. In fact, the implementation of family policy over the past decade has filled in the gaps in the organization of a network of pre-school institutions.

Table 2. Average values of variables in clusters

Variable	Cluster 1 (26 regions)	Cluster 2 (35 regions)	Cluster 3 (20 regions)	Cluster 4 (2 regions)
X_1 – total fertility rate, children	1.61	1.67	1.70	2.25
X_2 – poverty level among families with children, %	18.8	33.6	37.7	57.7
X_3 – growth rate of pre-school education provision for children, aged 1–6 years, %	109.9	108.4	130.4	415.9
X_4 – growth rate of the total fertility coefficient, %	111.3	107.1	101.2	75.7

Table 3. Content of clusters

Cluster 1 (26 regions)	Belgorod Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Tula Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast, Moscow, Komi Republic, Leningrad Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Saint-Petersburg, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Mordovia, Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan), Udmurt Republic, Krasnodar Krai, Nizhegorod Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Tomsk Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, Sakhalin Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug
Cluster 2 (35 regions)	Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Republic of North Ossetia – Alania, Oryol Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tver Oblast, Republic of Karelia, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Vologda Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Astrakhan Oblast, Perm Krai, Mari El Republic, Chuvash Republic – Chuvashia, Kirov Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Samara Oblast, Kurgan Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Irkutsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Kamchatka Krai, Primorsky Krai, Amur Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Altai Krai, Zabaykalsky Krai
Cluster 3 (20 regions)	Republic of Dagestan, Voronezh Oblast, Republic of Kalmykia, Tambov Oblast, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Altai Republic, Tyva Republic, Republic of Buryatia, Lipetsk Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Republic of Adygea (Adygea), Volgograd Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Stavropol Krai, Penza Oblast, Republic of Khakassia, Kemerovo Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Jewish Autonomous Oblast
Cluster 4 (2 regions)	Republic of Ingushetia, Chechen Republic.

The analysis of clusters shows that the situation with the birth rate and its dynamics, as well as socio-economic characteristics of family life in Russian regions, is very heterogeneous. 26 regions of cluster 1 have the lowest levels of fertility rates, despite the most significant growth in recent years, and poverty among families with children. Provision of 1—6 years old children with pre-school education services increased only by 9.9%.

Cluster 2 is the most typical. 35 Russian regions were included in it. They are characterized by higher birth levels, in comparison with cluster 1 regions, but birth rates' growth, on the contrary, is lower. There is a significant level of child poverty in these regions (33.6%, one third of families with children live below the poverty line).

20 regions of cluster 3 are characterized by higher levels of birth (although it did not increase during the analyzed period) and poverty among families with children (in comparison with clusters 1 and 2), as well as a more significant growth rate of children's provision with pre-school education in recent years (30.4% increase).

Two regions, included in cluster 4 (the Republic of Ingushetia, the Chechen Republic), have significantly higher levels of birth and poverty, in comparison with other regions, noticeable growth rates of provision of pre-school institutions' services, and huge (25%) birth decrease in the last decade. This situation made it possible to put them into a separate cluster.

The analysis of clusters' content (*Tab. 3*) does not reveal any geographical features in the formation of regions' typological groups. It is more about the specifics of a socio-economic situation in regions, included into a particular cluster.

The results of the cluster analysis allow us to say that there is an equalization of the birth rate in Russian regions. There is a significant decrease of the fertility level in regions with a high fertility and some growth in regions with relatively lower fertility, caused by demographic and family policy measures.

While implementing family policy measures in regions, it is necessary to remember that fertility grows in regions, where the level of life among families with children is higher, and the provision of pre-school education services is better.

The high birth rate model in regions with traditionally higher number of large families seems to have exhausted itself. The complexity of the family life organization and the need to ensure decent living standards contradict the large families' attitudes. We should not assume that fertility dynamics in regions with traditionally higher birth rates will improve average national numbers. Fertility also declines in these regions, and birth rates are highly sensitive to the characteristics of a socio-economic well-being.

Regions are quite different in terms of socio-economic opportunities for providing family support. In more wealthy regions, the level of provision with pre-school education is higher. In 2008-2017, the fertility increase in them was more significant than in less prosperous regions with initially higher birth rates.

The prospects of increasing the birth rate in Russia are probably related to solving the problem of economic independence of the family and the issue of combining family and non-family roles by parents with minor children.

Low standards of living and insufficient provision of pre-school education services led to lower fertility growth rates (in some regions — to decrease), despite birth stimulation with economic support measures (in particular, "maternity capital" program).

Conclusions

The results of the study showed that Russia could be characterized by a significant differentiation of regions in terms of the fertility rate, its dynamics, and response to family policy measures, which contributes to the development of the theory and practice of socio-demographic studies of the family and family policy. The analysis of indicators, which serve as indicators of the effectiveness of several strategic documents, makes it possible to formulate certain recommendations for the implementation of family policy.

Families are affected by family and demographic policies. However, while assisting a family in implementation of its functions (most of all, reproductive and life-saving), areas and measures of support overlap: often it is difficult to classify them. This is where the logic of socio-economic policy faces formalism and duplication of activities. It is impossible to identify and evaluate the effectiveness of individual strategic programs in the area of family and demographic policy, because such measures as the fertility rate increase, the reduction of the poverty level among families with children, and the growth of the pre-school services' availability are integral elements of various programs. We can only assess the effectiveness of the state family policy as a whole.

Many program documents include a set of measures for overcoming the poverty of families and helping them raise children. The poverty level of families with children, despite the measures included in a number of strategic documents, remains very significant. However, the current model of fertility rate in Russia dynamically responses to socio-economic conditions of family life. The implementation of "maternity capital" program led to the increase of fertility indicators in regions, where its level was initially lower. There was a decrease of regional differentiation of fertility indicators. The implementation of reproductive plans is slowed down by ordinary shortage of means for fulfilling child's basic needs in the environment of mass poverty among families with children.

The living standards of families with children cannot be raised only by means of social assistance at the households' current poverty level. Systemic changes in the system of wages are required. These measures should be a center of Russian families' economic assistance.

Support for families in the form of the "maternity capital" program has had a certain impact on the growth of the birth rate. However, in the long term, taking into account the dynamics of the total fertility rate and the nature of the gender and age structure of the population, large-scale measures of economic support for families are necessary to increase their economic independence, if the state is interested in increasing the birth rate.

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Differentiation of regions according to the level of fertility is reduced. At the same time, the study showed that families respond differently to family policy measures, and the low level of availability of pre-school education services is perceived as a problem in regions with relatively higher standards of living. In many Russian regions, the risk of entering poverty zone is quite significant for families with children, which makes them less receptive to current economic measures of family policy. Poor families need systematic support which would help them overcome poverty.

In Russia, at the current development stage, there are no formed social mechanisms that would allow combining family responsibilities and professional growth in the modern model of economic life. Thus, men and women often make a choice in favor of a professional career: they do not want to sacrifice anything in the interests of a family and children. In the national project "Demography", there are no measures which would allow families go along the way of forming "family–job" balance: the development of pre-school institutions is an only exception. It should be remembered that families from more prosperous regions are more receptive to the availability of a good pre-school education during the implementation of their reproductive plans.

Current demographic problems and the transformation of the family institution open up new opportunities for increasing the prestige of a family lifestyle. It should be taken into account in the further development of the national project "Demography". From our point of view, there is a need for systemic changes of the labor market, long-term programs for the development of a flexible labor market and family entrepreneurship, and the creation of a social infrastructure that allows combining the needs of families and professional fulfillment. At the same time, economic incentives are needed for employers who carry out activities in the interests of

employees with family responsibilities. It is necessary to reduce the tax burden on families with several children by switching to a family tax on the income of family members (it was proposed in the discussion on the plan for the implementation of Concept of state family policy). With the help of the family benefits system, it is possible to increase the income of people with family responsibilities, taking into account their dependency burden. This will reduce the level of poverty among families with several children.

Most likely, there will be no immediate results. Complex solutions and the involvement of various actors in the solution of family problems require long-term, financially expensive programs which should be implemented at the federal level and take into account the regional specifics of the situation concerning families with children. It is necessary to increase the share of expenditures on family and maternity benefits in relation to the gross domestic product of the country and the gross regional products of the regions to 2.2%, as it was proposed in the Decree on basic directions of state family policy of 1996. It should be mentioned that the ratio of spending on family and maternity benefits to GDP in Russia decreased from 1% in 1996–1997 to 0.9% in 2016 [39]. Such dynamics indirectly indicate the real significance of family policy in the system of state activity.

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