| Аннотация | The article examines the institutional aspect of state regulation of foreign economic activity in Russia. Theoretical basis of the research is the concept of “educational protectionism” by F. List, which involves the cultivation of “young industries” under the shelter of protective customs tariffs until they become competitive in domestic and foreign markets; as well as the theory of “delinking” by S. Amin, who considers protectionism as a method for the countries, which are on the periphery of the world economy, to exit the relations of unequal exchange with industrialized countries: national economic policy should be aimed at meeting the needs of domestic development, rather than promoting international competitiveness (food security, full employment, minimum wage, etc.). Such measures were a stable element of the socio-economic model of the USSR and acted as a source of capital accumulation for the development of industry and the military-industrial complex. We come to the conclusion that the mindless borrowing (transplantation) of institutions of free trade and protectionism in Russia in the 1990s, which was not accompanied by the formulation and implementation of state strategic plans for the development of the Russian economy, led to the formation of a “mutant” economic model. On the one hand, the complete abandonment of the policy of state monopoly on foreign trade led to the flooding of the domestic market with imported goods and, as a consequence, massive ruin of domestic manufacturing enterprises. On the other hand, the purpose of the fragmentary application of protectionist policy instruments was not so much to support national producers as to create a comfortable environment for the distribution of state property among a narrow group of people close to the authorities, as well as favoring monopoly capital in a number of sectors of the domestic economy. |
|---|
