| Аннотация | The article investigates issues concerning the development of countries amid geopolitical turbulence. In particular, it is shown that the development of the world economic system has two phases: monocentricity, with a leader country and the world order it has established; and multipolarity with an increasing chaos and the struggle of many countries for the reconstruction of the world. These processes are based on scale effect, which at the stage of multipolarity operates in the external sphere in the form of territorial expansion, and at the stage of monocentricity – in the internal sphere in the form of technological innovations within the corporate sector of individual countries. The paper considers the restoration of the phenomenon of strategic advantages, which barely manifested itself in the geopolitical space for a long time. To explain the cyclical rising of this effect, we introduce the concepts of independent (natural) and controlled (artificial) development instead of the concepts of outstripping development and catching-up development that are fading into the background; we show that artificial development exists in the form of acceleration and containment. This made it possible to put forward a political model of sovereignty “leader – satellites/opponents – neutral zone” instead of I. Wallerstein’s technological model “core – semi-periphery – periphery”. We propose and substantiate a quantitative criterion for strategic advantages, according to which they are observed under multiple differences (twofold or more) in the economic indicators of the compared countries. The framework study uses five indicators: area, GDP, population, technology level (GDP per capita), availability of nuclear weapons; the first four parameters are assessed quantitatively with the help of strategic advantages index; the fifth parameter is assessed qualitatively. We consider examples of the phenomenon of strategic advantages for bilateral relations: Azerbaijan/Armenia; Russia/Ukraine; South Korea/North Korea; India/Pakistan, etc. We also reveal the significance of this effect for Russia’s long-term foreign policy strategy |
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